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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

CECIL A. DICKSON,

Case No.
9343

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On 17 May 1960 the appellant, Cecil A. Dickson, was convicted by jury trial of the crime of robbery under the provisions of 7 6-51-1, U. C. A. 19 53.
The long resume of facts presented by the appellant
in his brief is adequate to apprise the reader of the
summary of evidence presented, but somewhat excessive to the issues of error raised on appeal in the brief.
A more detailed examination of the specific por-
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tions of the trial, relevant to the Issues before the
Court, is felt necessary.
A more detailed examination of the specific portions of the trial relevant to the issues before the Cou~t
is felt necessary.
The appellant raised the issue of alibi at his trial.
In support of his contention, deposition testimony of
several witnesses was introduced and presented to the
jury (R. 148). For all but one witness the state presented cross interrogatories to the questions asked by
the accused. It was stipulated that the questions to
each deponent were put and answered under oath (R.
149). Rose Vaile, the appellant's mother, was the
first deposition witness. Her general testimony on direct examination was in support of the appellant's
contention of alibi. On cross examination the District
Attorney posed the following question and received
the following answer:

''Q. Do you understand that you are
under oath and that any answers you give
which are not true could subject you to a criminal charge of per jury?
"A.

Yes" (R. 152).

The appellant's brother also testified by way of
deposition, and on cross examination the same sequence of question and answer was had as to his awareness of possible criminal charges for perjury as is set
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out above (R. 157). In addition to a question concerning what, if anything, was said between he and
appellant's attorney, the following answer was elicited
(R. 157-8).

"Q.

What was said and by whom?

HA. He just asked us about this, and we
answered them. He told us that we knew that
we would be under oath or something like that,
and told us whatever we did to tell the truth."
The appellant's sister-in-la\v also acknowledged
that she was under oath and subject to perjury (R.
160). The same indication was obtained by cross interrogatory from the accused's sister (R. 165). Only
the ex-wife of the accused did not affirmatively indicate an awareness of possible perjury charges for false
testimony by deposition (R. 168). This apparently
was because the District Attorney posed no cross interrogatories. However, a clear stipulation was before
the jury that all deponents were under oath (R. 149).
With reference to the District Attorney's argument to the jury concerning deposition testimony, it
does not appear of record specifically what was said;
apparently the comment was raised on rebuttal argument (R. 24 7). However, the Court specifically allowed the accused's counsel the right of additional
rebuttal to the argument (R. 247).
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Accused's counsel requested an instruction be
given to the jury to the effect that witnesses giving
testimony by interrgoatory are subject to the penalties
of perjury (R. 249). The Court indicated in writing
on the proposed instruction that it was to be given in
substance (R. 23). The Court thereafter instructed
the jury without specific deference to witnesses who
appeared in person or by deposition, but instructed
the jury that, as to which, if any, witness they were
to believe, and what weight to be given thereto is a
matter of their determination (R. 43-45). The
Court's failure to give the exact requested instruction
is claimed to be prejudicial error.
The accused took the stand to testify in his own
behalf. After testifying on direct examination he was
subjected to cross examination by the District Attorney. The relevant part of this cross examination is
set out below:

''Q.

And you were in prison for robbery
weren't you?
"A.

Yes sir.

''Q.

And that was on two counts,

wasn't it?
''A.

I believe so.

"Mr. King: Mr. Banks, you may ask how
many convictions there were I believe.
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"Mr. Banks: I am using this for the purpose of modus operandi, Your Honor.
''The Court: I think he can tell-you
could go into the type of conviction, how many
convictions there were. I think he may answer
if there were two counts.

*

*

*

''A.

Yes, two counts.

"Q.

And that was two separate robber-

ies?
"A. Yes, sir, but they were all right in
the same-

"Q.

Same area of time?

"A.

About the same, yes.

"Q.

But they were two different robber-

"A.

Yes sir.

ies?

"Q. And both of those happened to be
food markets too, didn't they?
"A.

No, sir. They were liquor stores"

(R. 211-212).
This last testimony was all unobjected to. Counsel's
objection, if such it was, was directed to requesting the
District Attorney to ask the number of convictions.
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The testimony as to time and liquor stores was volunteered by the accused.
The District Attorney then went on to question
the accused about an incident that happened subsequent to the charge he faced at the instant trial (R.
213). The incident concerned a fracas in which the
accused participated with his brother, and was charged
with being an accessory to attempted robbery (R.
218). Whether this incident resulted in a conviction
is unclear. The incident was brought out over objection by the accused's counsel (R. 214) although on
recross the accused's counsel made additional inquiry
concerning the incident (R. 219). It appeared that
this incident was in association with the accused's
brother. The prosecution's evidence in the instant case
inferred that the crime with which the accused was
charged was also so carried out. (Appellant's Brief,
pp. 2, 4.) The trial judge instructed the jury that
the evidence of other crimes committed by the accused
could not be considered as evidence that he committed
the crime with which he was now charged, but that it
could be considered only as to what weight to give to
the testimony of the defendant himself (R. 46).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT GIVSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ING THE INSTRUCTION REQUESTED
BY THE ACCUSED THAT PERSONS WHO
TESTIFIED FALSELY COULD BE
CHARGED WITH PERJURY.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE
OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS OF THE
ACCUSED NOR IN RECEIVING TESTIMONY SURROUNDING THE CONVICTION.
POINT Ill.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE OF OTHER
MISCONDUCT OF THE ACCUSED NOT
RESULTING IN CONVICTION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT GIVING THE INSTRUCTION REQUESTED
BY THE ACCUSED THAT PERSONS WHO
TESTIFIED FALSELY COULD BE
CHARGED WITH PERJURY.
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There is no requirement that a court give every
instruction proposed by a party. If the instructions
given adequately appraise the jury of the law, the defendant may not command that the instructions be
given in the words proposed by him. State v. Campbell, 116Utah74,208P.2d530 (1949). Itissufficient if from all the instructions, when read as a
whole, the jury is clearly appraised of the law that it
must apply. Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348
P. 2d 931; State v. Cox, 106 Utah 253, 147 P. 2d
858 ( 1944). Nor is there any requirement that a
court give an instruction that would mislead the jury,
be unnecessary, or which is erroneous. State v. Erwin,
101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285 (1942). Nor is it
error to refuse a requested instruction if the matters
are necessarily encompassed in other instructions.
State v. 1-Iougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229
( 193 7). Error in the instant case can only be claimed
if the proposed instruction, proffered by the accused,
was applicable and correct, and if the Court had a
duty to so instruct and did not otherwise adequately
cover the tendered matter. U. S. v. Hancey, 108 F.
2d 835 (C. C. A. Utah 1940).
An analysis of the facts of the instant case and
the proposed instruction make it clear that there has
been no error. The appellant contends that since the
testimony of some of the witnesses was by deposition,
and that since the prosecutor inferred they were lying
that unless the proposed instruction was given the jury
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may be mislead into believing that the testimony of
deposition witnesses is not of the same weight as that
of witnesses that appear in person. It should be noted
first that counsel did not make any request for instructions relative to deposition testimony per se, but merely
requested that the jury be informed that all witnesses,
both those present in person and by deposition, are
subject to perjury charges for knowingly giving false
testimony. It is submitted first that such an instruction is irrelevant and without merit, and since there
is no requirement that irrelevant or unmeritorious instructions be givel?-, no error \vas committed. State v.
Erwin, supra.
The essential requirement to a witnesses' testimony is not that a witness be under legal compulsion
to speak truthfully, but that the witness have knowledge of the need to tell the truth and recognize the
necessity for doing so. The fact that a statute exists
making it a crime to give false testimony is of no matter to the jury, what is essential is that they know that
a witness feels compulsion to tell the truth. In the
instant case the proposed instruction was merely an
incomplete paraphrasing of the penal definition of
perjury, 76-45-1, U. C. A. 1953. It would be no more
relevant than an instruction on what constituted the
law of perjury. The crime of perjury was not before
the jury nor was there any evidence that perjury had
been committed. Instructions should only concern the
crime charged and not others not before the court.
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Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, § 668. Therefore, the
instruction was not geared to the evidence, was not
relevant, nor could it properly effect the juries' delib~
erations. Instructions not adjusted to the evidence or
which are irrelevant are not proper. Draine v. State,
89 S. E. 2d 182, 2116a 801; People v. Liss, 35 Cal.
2d 570, 219 P. 2d 789. The jury already had before
them the testimony of all but one of the witnesses in~
dicating that they understood and believed they could
be charged with perjury for wilfully giving false testimony. The specific admission of belief which evidences a motive to tell the truth is what is essential;
giving the jury an abstract statement of criminal law
could in no way be relevant to the charge or add to
the information before the jury as to the weight to be
given the testimony. After a witness had admitted he
believed he could be punished, which is the essential
element of credibility of a witness, McCormick, Evidence, p. 139, et seq., an instruction that the criminal
law imposed sanctions would be immaterial. It would
not be material to any evidence before the Court, nor
material to effect the credibility or weight to be given
such tstimony. The correct instruction to have been
requested would have been one that deposition testi~
mony is entitled to the same consideration, the same
rebuttable presumption that the witness speaks the
truth, and same judgment on the part of the juror
with reference to its weight. Such an instruction was
not requested, and is a far cry from the immaterial
requesct made by counsel for the accused.
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Under the circumstances of this case, it appearing
that the requested instruction was not material to any
issue before the jury, and was merely a statement of
penal law not then being considered by the Court, it
was not error to deny to give the same. State v. Phillips, 136 Kan. 407, 15 P. 2d 408. It is said that instructions must include two principal groups: ( 1)
those stating the substantive law of the case, and ( 2)
those relating to the rules for weighing evidence. Since
the requested instruction fits neither of these categories
it was not error to refuse it. Abbott, ·Criminal Trial
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 673.
It is generally recognized that the court has power
to modify and conform the instruction to its own view
of the law. Abbott, op. cit., p. 1249. In the instant
case, as evidenced by the trial judge's notation on the
proposed instruction, the correct instruction concerning the weight to be accorded the testimony was given.
(Instructions 7, 8 and 9. R. 44-45.) There is no
question but that these instructions were correct. They
properly apprised the jury of their duty to consider
the testimony of all witnesses. In construing these
instructions as a whole they adequately supplied the
jury with the correct principal to be applied in weighing the evidence. As the instruction proposed would
have added nothing, the instruction given adequately
corrected the situation and sufficed.
Finally it cannot be contended that the accused
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was prejudiced by any failure to give the instruction as
requested. The jury had before them the testimony of
the witnesses themselves that they believed they could
be punished for perjury if they knowingly gave false
testimony, and the accused's counsel was afforded additional time to argue against any inference that the
District Attorney may have made concerning the deposition testimony. As such it cannot be claimed that
the failure to give the instruction in any way prejudiced the accused or left the jury without a sufficient
guide to weigh the evidence.
From this it must be concluded that no prejudicial error was made by the trial court concerning the
charge to the jury.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE
OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS OF THE
ACCUSED NOR IN RECEIVING TESTIMONY SURROUNDING THE CONVICTION.
It is a generally recognized principal of law that
an accused testifying on his own behalf may be impeached like any other witness by proving that he has
been convicted of a felony. State v. Thorne, 39 Utah
208, 117 Pac. 58; 77-44-6, U. C. A. 1953. There
is no question then, but that the examination of the
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accused Dickson concerning a previous conviction for
robbery is proper for impeachment purposes. There
is no question but that the examiner may ask about
the name of the crime committed, State v. Crawford~
60 Utah 6, 206 Pac. 717 ( 1922), and the punishment awarded, McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 43. As to
how far in addition an examiner may proceed is not
clear. Certainly if he goes forward without specific
objection by counsel no error may be claimed. Wigmore, Evidence~ § 18. In the instant case counsel was
hardly lucid in his objection to inquiry into the facts
of the accused's past convictions. The record merely
reflects a statement from counsel addressed to the prosecutor concerning inquiry into the number of convictions. His failure to object to the prosecutor's question
concerning details of the crime may well act as a
waiver. McCormick, Evidence~ Ch. 6. It must be
noted that the trial judge said nothing concerning the
prosecutor's right to enter into the details of the crime,
and presumably from the Court's statement nothing
would prevent the defense counsel from then objecting.
Counsel's failure to do so must be deemed a wa1ver,
and he cannot now claim error on appeal.
Even so the inquiry, based on the representation
of the prosecutor that it was to go to modus operandi
was proper. Evidence and facts of a specific crime may
be introduced for the purpose of showing plan or
scheme. The modus operandi of a robber is of relevance to show that the accused in the past has also
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used such a plan or scheme to effect his illegal means.
People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P. 2d 924.
In the instant case the prosecutor possibly did
not go far enough to clearly demonstrate the full effect
of the principal of modus operandi; however, what
he did elicit was relevant. He did demonstrate a close
relationship to the instant crime. It was shown that
other retail type business establishments had been the
subject of the accused's criminal intentions, and that
his operations were in close proximiity of time to each
other. All of these factors were relevant to the mode
of commission of the instant crime. It must be remembered that the modern criminal does all he can to
disguise his actions and avoid detection; therefore, the
requirement that a scheme be a full reflection of past
conduct is ridiculous. With specific reference to the
personalities and intelligence of white male criminals
convicted of robbery, see 49 Journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology and Police Science 412. It is enough
that the evidence reasonably tends to connect the accused to the crime charged. State V. Scott, Ill Utah
9, 175 P. 2d 1016; State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307,
148 P. 2d 327. As was said in State v. Neal, 123
Utah 93, 254 P. 2d I 053 ( 1953), with reference to
the rule in Utah:

H* * * the state may not prove other
offenses where the sole and only purpose of such
proof is to show defendant's propensity to commit crime because the jury is apt to give such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence undue weight, but such evidence is admissible when offered for the purpose of showing an intention or design to or a motive for
commission of the offense charged. In other
words, the rule as stated in the N emier case and
more clearly by Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe in the
Scott case, supra, is that evidence of other offenses is excluded only where the sole purpose is
to show defendant's propensity for the commission of crime and does not include cases where
the purpose of such evidence is to show defendant's intention or design to or motive for commission of the crime charged."
Hence in the instant case it was not error to allow the
prosecutor to proceed as he did. State v. Lyman, 10
Utah 2d 58, 348 P. 2d 340.
Finally, it cannot be said that the receipt of the
additional information prejudiced the accused. A substantial number of cases have indicated that the record
of the former conviction itself is admissible in evidence,
and hence anything contained therein not directed to
inciting the jury should be received. State . Haugenson, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229; State v. Green, 167
Wash. 266, 9 P. 2d 62; State v. Rodia, 132 N. J. L.
199, 39 Atl. 2d 484. Since the facts, actually volunteered by the accused in the instant case, would have
been shown had the record itself been introduced, no
claim of prejudice should be had. In addition in the
instant case the only factor not clearly admissible even
if a very narrow approach is taken would be the type
of store involved. This was volunteered by the acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cused in the instant case, and even so did not hurt his
position since it diluted the more specific connection
the prosecutor had tried to demonstrate. As a consequence it is equally as inferable that he was helped by
it as hindered. The appellant's claim of error on this
point is, therefore, not well taken.

POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE OF OTHER
MISCONDUCT OF THE ACCUSED NOT
RESULTING IN CONVICTION.
Appellant contend sthat the trial court erred in
allowing examination of the accused, by the District
Attorney, into the incident in Fort Worth, Texas,
that resulted in the accused being charged as an accessory after the fact to the crime of robbery. The objection to such testimony was that it was immaterial;
this objection was overruled by the trial court, and
after an unrecorded conference the prosecution was
allowed to proceed with the examination. The evidence disclosed that on April 5, 19 59, subsequent in
time, but closely related to, the offense involved in the
instant action, the accused, in the company of his
brother, parked near a store, in Fort Worth, Texas;
thereafter the accused's brother went to a telephone
booth, and as the store owner came to the store the
accused's brother went up to him. A struggle resulted
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and the accused and his brother were shot by the store
owner. The accused assisted his brother in making his
get away. The accused's brother was charged with
attempted robbery and the accused with being an accessory ( R. 213-2 2 0) .
The evidence was admissible on two bases. ( 1)
It was evidence properly admissible to impeach the
witness since it demonstrated misconduct on the part
of the accused even though not resulting in a conviction. Wigmore, Evidence, § § 983, 986. (2) The
evidence was admissible to show the scheme or design
regularly employed by the accused in carrying out
criminal activities. State v. Lyman, 10 U. 2d 58, 348
P. 2d 340.
The general rule of evidence relating to the first
point is stated in McCormick, Evidence, p. 87:
''The English common law tradition of
'cross-examination to credit', permits the counsel to inquire into the associations and personal
history of the witness, including any particular
misconduct which would tend to discredit his
character, though not the subject of conviction
for crime.''
Thus, in People v. Sorge, 301 N. Y. 198, 93 N.
E. 2d 63 7 ( 19 50), it was held in a prosecution for
abortion to be within the sound discretion of the trial
judge to allow, by way of cross-examination, inquiry
into other abortions committed by the accused.
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In State v. Neal, 222 N. C. 546, 23 S. E. 2d 911
( 194 3), it was said that inquiry into other misconduct not amounting to conviction, viz a viz, larceny,
assault, vagrancy, was permissible where the accused
was charged with murder.
The matter is usually committed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge, McCormick, supra, p. 87.
In the instant case the trial judge gave consideration to
the objections of the accused, and then ruled to allow
the evidence. The accused did not deny the matter,
but in fact enlarged upon the questions put by the
prosecution. Counsel for the accused on redirect took
it upon himself to expand the scope of inquiry and to
explain away any impropriety. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the Court abused its discretion. The rule in Utah has been recognized in the
past. State v. Neal, 123 Utah 93, 254 P. 2d 1053
( 1953). The only apparent limitations are those normally placed upon claimed irrelevant or immaterial
testimony. The testimony of the vvitness ·was relevant
to his credibility. The misconduct shown or examined
into was such as to cast doubt upon the testimonial
worth of the accused. Wigmore, supra, Section 981.
The incident was closely related in time to the instant
charge, and finally the accused was given full latitude
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to rebut. Under these circumstances the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion and the testimony was proper
for impeachment.
The evidence was also admissible to show modus
operandi. The evidence of the subsequent misconduct
fits into the criminal pattern characterized by the activities of the instant case. As such the evidence was admissible to show a scheme or design. State v. Neat
supra; State v. Lyman, supra.
The evidence disclosed a similar pattern of operation between the misconduct in Fort Worth and that
with which tl?e accused was charged in Salt Lake. The
actions show joint activity with the accused's brother;
it demonstrates the use of the automobile as a get-away
device, and finally the subject of the robbery being a
retail grocery was the same. These facts were offered
not to show the tendency of the accused for crime in
general, but with direct relationship to the crime
charged and hence were properly before the jury. State
V. Neal, supra.
As was said in State v. Neal.. supra, at page 100
U tab Reports:
''It was not error to permit the District
Attorney to cross-examine defendant as to other
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offenses. Over defendant's objection the District Attorney asked him if he committed four
robberies in California, giving the time and
place of each. * * *
•'Of course, if this questioning stood alone
and was made in bad faith without the District
Attorney having reason to believe his guilty of"
such offenses, such procedure would be highly
improper and the case should be reversed. But
the evidence does not show that such was the
case. * * *"
Nor does the evidence in the instant case show any illwill or bad faith on the part of the prosecutor. Evidence as elicited was dead y relevant, and tends to show
the District Attorney acted justifiably. Under these
circumstances the receipt of the evidence was not error.
Nor could the receipt of the evidence be said to be
prejudiciaL The accused's counsel adopted the matter
on redirect and the accused was allowed to explain his
version to the jury without contradiction. In addition,
the jury was instructed that the accused's testimony
was to be weighed in the same fashion as any other
witness; under such circumstances the accused was not
prejudiced.
CONCLUSION
The accused was given a full and fair hearing on
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the charges against him. A jury after hearing and
weighing the evidence against him and on his behalf
adjudged him guilty. An analysis of the errors raised
on appeal show them to be without merit; as such the
Court should affirm the jury's decision.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,

RONALD N. BOYCE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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